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MIRANDA DECISION REVISITED: DID
IT GIVE CRIMINALS TOO MANY
RIGHTS?*
Stephen J. Markman"* & Paul Marcus***

I.

COMMENTS OF STEPHEN J. MARKMAN

In 1963 a teenage girl was kidnapped and raped on her way home from
work. The police later apprehended the rapist. Following a brief interview and
an identification lineup; he gave a full confession to the police. The confession
was later used in securing his conviction. Three years later, in 1966, the Supreme
Court overturned Ernest Miranda's conviction.' The Court found no ground for
concluding that Miranda's confession was not freely given or for doubting that
he committed the offense. However, the Court did find error in the failure of
the police to comply with a set of restrictions on questioning that had simply
not existed prior to the Miranda C:lecision. In a unique five to four decision, a
decision that I believe could not have been replicated before 1966 or after 1966,
the Court departed from recognized constitutional standards and prescribed a
new set of non-constitutional procedures for police questioning of suspects in
custody.
The Miranda decision has continued to define the ground rules for custodial
questioning up to the present time. The prescription of these extra-constitutional
standards has resulted in a two-fold tragedy. It has been tragic in its effect on
the innocent victims of crime by impairing the government's ability to bring
criminals to justice. It has also been tragic in its effect on the protection of the
rights of persons suspected of crime. The Miranda rules are an inept and
ineffective means of ensuring fair treatment of suspects in custodial questioning.
Their nationwide imposition by judicial fiat has had the practical effect of stifling
any efforts to develop more effective means of doing so.
• These are the opening remarks made by the respective authors at a debate at the University
of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Kansas City, Missouri, on April 21, 1988. The debate was
presented as a part of the Joseph Cohen Lecture Series. The University of Missouri-Kansas City Law
Review has provided editorial notes.
•• Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy, United States Department of Justice. B.A.,
Duke University, 1971; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1974.
••• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona, College of Law; A.B., University of
California at Los Angeles, 1968; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1971.
I. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

15

16

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57, No. 1

Before turning to the evidence on these points, I should briefly explain what
I believe are three basic misconceptions about Miranda. It is particularly important
to have a clear understanding of the radical character of the Miranda restrictions
because recent reporting frequently has misrepresented this issue. The first misconception is that the Miranda rules are required by the Constitution. This
misconception is directly refuted both by the Constitution and by the Miranda
decision. The Constitution does not prescribe interrogation procedures. 2 It only
states that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. In other
words, it simply prohibits the actual coercion of suspects or defendants to obtain
incriminating statements. The Miranda decision emphasized that the procedures
it delineated are only one possible approach to guarding against unconstitutional
coercion in police questioning, and explicitly encouraged the federal government
and the states to continue to search for better, more effective procedures. 3
Numerous more recent decisions of the Supreme Court also have explicitly
affirmed that the Miranda rules are not constitutional requirements but only a
particular set of safeguards whose purpose is to reduce the likelihood of coercion. 4
The second common misconception is that the Miranda rules, even if not
constitutionally required, at least serve the important purpose of informing a
suspect of his constitutional rights. However, this also is incorrect. The rights to
which the Miranda warnings relate are primarily non-constitutional restrictions
that were created by the Miranda decision itself. For example, the right to counsel
in custodial interrogation, mentioned in the third and fourth Miranda warnings,
simply did not exist prior to Miranda, and is .now clearly regarded by the Supreme
Court as a non-constitutional "prophylactic" right. s Even the first Miranda
warning telling a suspect that he has a· right to remain silent, is at best, a highly
imprecise and misleading way of referring to the Constitution's prohibition of
compelling a person to incriminate himself. 6 The Constitution prohibits the
government from engaging in coercion, but it does not create a right to remain
silent in any broader sense. These are different matters. In particular, there is
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless· on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
4. See Connecticut v. Barrett, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 107 S.Ct. 828, 832 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974).
5. See Barrett, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 107 S.Ct. at 832; Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958);
Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical Prospective, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 193, 203-04, 23941 (1987).
6. See supra note 2.
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no constitutional rule that a person cannot even be asked questions unless he
consents to be questioned. As will be discussed shortly, a rule against asking
questions without the suspect's consent is one of the central features of the
Miranda system and perhaps its most damaging characteristic.
After delivery of the Miranda warnings, one might suppose that a police
officer could then at least ask a suspect questions. At that point, questioning is
still not allowed. This position leads to the third basic misconception about
Miranda: the belief that it is simply a matter of reciting some warnings to a
suspect before asking questions. In fact, even after the Miranda warnings have
been given, a suspect cannot be asked questions unless he affirmatively consents
to be questioned. In legalese, this requirement is referred to as the requirement
of a knowing and intelligent waiver. The radical character pf this restriction
cannot be overstated. It is the essence of what is wrong with Miranda. Suppose,
for example, that a person was taken into custody on suspicion of committing a
murder and was given the Miranda warnings by the officer conducting the
interview. Suppose further that the officer then said to the suspect, in a wholly
inoffensive and non-pressuring way, that he would like to get the suspect's side
of the story. If the suspect then freely gave a full confession to the murder, it
could not be used at trial, but would have to be concealed from the jury. In the
absence of an affirmative waiver, a suspect cannot be questioned at all, no matter
how brief, how restrained, and how proper the questioning may be. The practical
effect of these innovations is that a significant proportion of criminal suspects
simply cannot be questioned at all, because they do not give a waiver or express
an interest in talking to a lawyer. This group includes a great many suspects who
might be quite willing to talk if they could be asked questions, but who do not
submit to questioning when questioning is conditioned on their affirmatively
expressing a desire to waive the rights set out in Miranda warnings.
· A number of empirical studies carried out in the immediate aftermath of
Miranda indicate that the resulting harm to the effectiveness of police investigation
has been extreme. For example, one study in Pittsburgh examined interrogations
by police detectives in several major crime categories.' Prior to Miranda, detectives
in Pittsburgh had advised suspects that they had a right not to talk and a right
to counsel. Despite this partial use of Miranda-like procedures before the Miranda
decision, the implementation of the full range of Miranda restrictions resulted in
a major impairment of the police's ability to obtain evidence from suspects.
After Miranda, over forty percent of suspects could not be questioned at all, in
contrast to the pre-Miranda situation in which every suspect at least could be
questioned. Miranda also resulted in a major reduction in admissions of guilt.
For example, it cut in half the number of confessions in the homicide and
robbery categories. Before Miranda, about sixty percent of suspected killers and
7. Seeburger and Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh - A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L.
REv. I (1967). The study was based on files of the Detective Branch of the Pittsburgh Police Bureau,
which conducted investigations of homicides and serious felonies.
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robbers confessed; after Miranda, only about thirty percent did so. Studies in a
number of other cities have produced consistent findings concerning the effects
of Miranda. 8 For example, District Attorney (now Senator) Arlen Specter of
Pennsylvania reported that an estimated ninety percent of suspects in Philadelphi.a
made statements to the police prior to Miranda. After Miranda, the corresponding
figure was only about forty percent.
These empirical findings only confirm what common sense would suggest
concerning the effect of rules like Miranda. Whether guilty or innocent, a person
who has been arrested for a crime is the one person in the world who knows
the most about the truth or falsity of the charges against him. Rules that often
bar the police from seeking the truth from that uniquely knowledgeable individual
will necessarily impose a heavy toll on the search for the truth. As Justice Byron
White observed in his dissent in Miranda,
In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist
or other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to
repeat his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence there will not be a
gain, but a loss, in human dignity.•

Justice White's words have proven to be prophetic. In light of subsequent
experience, we now are in a better position to assess the magnitude of this loss
and can see that it has been very great indeed. Innocent citizens have been
victimized by criminals who would have been brought to justice but for the
impediments to the pursuit of truth created by the Miranda decision. The same
point may be seen in another way by considering what would happen if rules
were adopted that barred the police from attempting to obtain fingerprint
evidence, eyewitness testimony, or any other type of important evidence in half
of the cases in which they currently are free to seek it. No one would question
that such rules would impair the effectiveness of police investigation and damage
the government's ability to protect the public from crime. The Miranda rules
operate in precisely this way, limiting the law enforcement authorities' ability to
obtain one of the most important types of evidence in criminal cases, the
confession.
The objection is made that even if the Miranda rules do occasionally free
criminals and endanger the public, this cost is justified by the risk that questioning
will be carried out in an abusive or coercive manner if not stringently restricted.
However, any legitimate concern over the possibility of abuse cuts in the opposite
direction. The Miranda rules do not further the protection of suspects in any
sensible or appropriate way, and they have discouraged the adoption of more
effective means to that end. As Justice Harlan observed in his Miranda dissent,
an officer who is willing to abuse a suspect to get a confession and lie about it
8. See Markman, supra note ~. at 224-22~.
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, ~42 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
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in court obviously would be just as willing to lie about giving Miranda warnings
and getting a waiver . 10
Moreover, even assuming general compliance by the police, the Miranda
rules are not a rationally conceived set of safeguards. Their practical effect is to
divide suspects into two classes: those who stand on their Miranda rights, and
those who waive these rights and submit to questioning. The effect of Miranda
on suspects who do not give a waiver is not to protect them from abusive
questioning, but to insulate them from any sort of questioning, no matter how
brief and restrained. On the other hand, in cases in which suspects do give a
waiver, interrogations can be carried out much as they were before Miranda.
They remain secret proceedings in which the avoidance of overbearing or heavyhanded practices depends on the self-restraint and honesty of the officers conducting
the interview. If questions arise later concerning the occurrence of illegalities or
improprieties, they are resolved on the basis of swearing matches between the
officers and the suspect.· · · .
If one is seriously interested in assuring fair treatment of suspects, far better
means than the Miranda rules are at hand. In particular, videotaping or recording
of interrogations would provide suspects with the type of objective protection
that is simply lacking under Miranda rules. Concerns about protracted grilling
of suspects or other overly aggressive practices also could be addressed sensibly
in other ways. For example, imposing reasonable time limits on questioning or
adopting specific rules concerning permissible behavior in questioning suspects
would go beyond the Miranda rules in assuring appropriate treatment of suspects,
but also would not carry Miranda's heavy costs to the effectiveness of police
investigation. In sum, Miranda is bad law under the Constitution, bad law for
protecting the public from crime, and bad law for protecting the rights of
suspects.
The challenge facing us today is to develop superior procedures and standards
to replace the Miranda rules. Congress's enactment of a statute in 1968 that
rejected Miranda's restrictions on the use of voluntary confessions, 11 and the
Supreme Court's clear view that these rules are in no sense constitutional
requirements, create an environment in which this challenge can be met. Moving
beyond the Miranda decision holds the promise of fundamental benefits in
promoting the protection of constitutional rights as well as fundamental benefits
in promoting the effective prosecution of crime. It is long past time that our
society, burdened by levels of violent crime unparalleled in the western democracies
and unparalleled in the history of our country, addressed the excesses of the
Warren court criminal justice jurisprudence. Even one innocent person's
terrorization or loss of life or limb would be too high a price to pay for Miranda's
10. /d. at SOS, 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. Crime Control Act of 1968, tit. II, 18 U.S.C. § 3.501 (198.5); the act reportedly "repealed"
Miranda and the McNabb-Mallory Rule in federal prosecutions; see, e.g., Markman, supra note S at
226-29.
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perverse procedures, ·and we will never know fully the enormity of the actual
toll. There is nothing Miranda preserves in the balance, certainly not any legitimate
right of the criminal suspect that offsets this continuing tragedy for civilized
society.
D. COMMENTS OF PAUL MARCUS

It is a pleasure to be here today to revisit the Supreme Court's monumental
decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 12 I think Miranda was good law and good policy
twenty-two years ago; I feel even more strongly about it today. If anything,
history has fully proved the five Justice majority correct; Miranda was needed
then and has worked extremely effectively in the period since. The debate over
Miranda, while not wholly irrelevant to our criminal justice system, nevertheless
is somewhat problematic. Were it not for a few vociferous law professors and a
few even more outspoken and visible members of the Justice Department's staff,
frankly, there would not be much debate about Miranda.
Police chiefs do not complain about it; former critics who are on the Court
do not complain about it; even many of those who strongly disagreed with the
decision twenty years ago do not complain about it today. To a certain extent,
the debate has passed by Miranda, except for the focus given by Attorney General
Edwin Meese. Much of the debate today is, and should be, on issues such as
identifying the sources of crime; dealing with questions of apprehending criminals
and detecting crime; coming up with alternatives for incarceration; dealing with
the cost, both societal an~ financial, of our tremendous drug problem; and trying
to keep a lid on a spiraling prison population. Those are the key and vital
questions that ought to be debated. Indeed if we really are concerned about
victims of crime, one might ask the question for instance, why is it that out of
every one hundred serious crimes, murder, rape, robbery, and assault, only fortyeight of them are reported to police. Only twenty-one out of one hundred result
in arrest. Only eleven out of one hundred result in cases filed for prosecution.
Only eight out of one hundred result in convictions. Only two out of one hundred
result in incarcerations. These issues are the kind that ought to be discussed.
Still, to a very real extent, the Attorney General of the United States focuses
the debate in the criminal justice system by the sheer power and prestige of his
office. For the last two years that focus has been on overruling Miranda, and
many, including my colleague Mr. Markman, have been a critical part of that
focus.· If we were to strengthen significantly Miranda today, or ·significantly
undercut it or even overrule it.• such action woul~ have little impact on the larger
questions asked. To a large degree, the debate over Miranda, as has been noted
by both critics and proponents, is a debate over a symbol, an important symbol,
but a symbol nevertheless~ It stands for all that we cherish in our system of
criminal justice and our system of constitutional rights. It is a symbol indicating
12. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
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that we understand these rights, that everyone has these rights and that these
rights will be enforced.
Perhaps the strongest criticism leveled at the Miranda case over the last
twenty years was the first criticism by Justice Harlan in his dissent.U He wrote
the great concurring decision in Katz, 14 the wiretapping case; he strongly enforced
the probable cause requirements in Spinelli, 15 which involved unnamed informants;
and he wrote the tremendous majority opinion in Cohen v. California, 16 where
a young man wore a jacket with a nasty obscenity on it. Still Justice Harlan was
fundamentally wrong in his criticism of Miranda. He strongly disagreed with
both the notion of adjudication in Miranda and the content of it. The "notion
of adjudication" referred to the Supreme Court's enacting a new "code of
criminal procedure," rather than deciding a case under the case or controversy
requirement. Justice Harlan disagreed with the substance of that codeY
If it was a code of criminal procedure, it was a mighty short code because
in spite of all the hand wringing and hair pulling over the last twenty years as
to the technicalities of Miranda and the complications of Miranda, the decision
itself is really quite simple. All the Court held was, using common sense definitions
of custody and interrogation, if suspects are in custody by having their freedom
of movement significantly limited and if they are being interrogated by police
officers, the statements of the suspects cannot be used ai trial to prove their
guilt unless the defendants received four warnings. Now this really cannot be all
that complicated if every school kid in the country knows them. Surely if you
have watched ·any movie starring Clint Eastwood, Sylvester Stallone, or Eddie
Murphy you know the warnings, and they fit on these little three by five cards
that all police officers seem to carry. You must be. warned that you have a right
to remain silent, anything you say will be used against you, you have a right to
an attorney, and if you cannot afford an attorney the state will provide you with
one. That is really all there is to it; not very complicated, not very complex,
certainly not very technical. That is why the huge outcry at the time of the
Miranda decision surprised me; what does not surprise me is the lack of focused
criticism now by the law enforcement community, by and large. The reality is
that those warnings are easy to give and most people understand them. Still, it
is important to give the warnings both for those who do not understand them
and for those who are in a very emotional state. In essense, this demonstrates
to the suspect that not only does the police officer understand what his rights
are but that the officer is fully prepared to honor those rights.
To a certain extent, the criticism over Miranda is itself somewhat technical.
There would be few people who would argue that knowing about your rights or
13.
14.
IS.
16.
17.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
403 U.S. IS (1971).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 514 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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being told about your rights is a bad thing. Instead, the argument is that telling
people their rights and enforcing those rights somehow interferes with effective
interrogation and in any case is contrary to the history and language of the fifth
amendment.' 8 The response is twofold. First, if giving warnings really does
interfere with effective interrogation, it seems we should be interfering with
effective interrogation. It is inconceivable to me that people seriously argue that
we, as a society, are worse off if individuals are advised of their rights and
advised of the right to have an attorney with them when confronted, while in
custody, by law enforcement officers. It would appear that such warnings make
sense, are a good idea, and as a matter of policy ought to be pursued.
As to the argument concerning the history and language of the fifth amendment, one must defer to the critics for they are probably right; if you look to
the language of the fifth amendment, which simply talks about no person being
compelled to be a witness against himself, that certainly does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that a suspect in custody, who is about to be interrogated, has
to receive four particular warnings. Moreover, it is also very clear that the
draftsmen of the fifth amendment, two hundred years ago, probably did not
contemplate a warning situation involving an interrogation such as was found in
Miranda.
However, this argument hardly ends the debate. The question as to the
precise language of the fifth amendment is not terribly helpful. The meaning of
the fifth amendment changes; the meaning of the Constitution changes and
should change. The Constitution is a living and vital instrument of effective
government and we are not locked into determining what was compulsion or
probable cause two hundred years ago versus today.
It is often stated that this position runs contrary to original intent. This
argument is somewhat beside the point, thus making it difficult to understand
the great love affair that critics of Miranda, as well as other cases, have with
the notion of original intent. Apparently the idea is that by discerning the original
intent, we then are locked into an interpretation given two hundred years ago.
That approaches the nonsensical. Times change, conditions change, and certainly
our country has changed dramatically. Original intent serves as a beacon, a
source of inspiration as to what we ought to do under the Constitution, and
perhaps as a guideline on limits of where this nation should move in the future.
To take much more from original intent, however, leads one down a very
dangerous path.
It may be asked, "How does one discern original intent?" Was it the intent
of the person who drafted the amendment to the Constitution, the people who
voted on it, the people who were in Congress at the time, or the general sense
of the population at that time? It may prove virtually impossible to discern such
intent. Moreover, even if one could, it could well be that our population today
would take a very different view of the matter. Certainly the best example of
18. See supra note 2.
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this is Gideon v. Wainwright.l 9 Unquestionably the draftsmen of the sixth
amendment 20 did not intend that the sixth amendment require counsel be provided
at state expense to indigents in felony cases. What was meant, as near as can be
determined today, is that if someone charged with a crime had an attorney, that
attorney ought not to be barred from participating in a criminal prosecution on
behalf of the individual. Yet when Gideon was decided in the early sixties, there
was no tremendous outcry. It was a decision whose time had come. Original
intent or not, in our civilized society, views change so that we needed the result
in Gideon.
We are left with a question which has faltered in numbers but remains quite
intense and has troubled many for the last twenty years. Why is there this
opposition to Miranda? The history and language of the fifth amendment, which
forms the basis of this criticism, are somewhat beside the point. The criticism
from opponents is simply that we did.som.ething fundamentally wrong in Miranda.
We ought not to be warning individuals Of their right to remain silent and right
to have counsel present during interrogation because that will disrupt effective
interrogation. If that truly is the criticism, it can be met head-on. As a matter
of policy we ought to be proud of advising individuals of their rights. Looking
at the history of interrogation in the last twenty years, it is an area where much
good has been done, and Miranda has had little negative impact. As Justice
Frankfurter observed about twenty-five years ago, not the least significant test
of the quality ofa civilization is its treatment of those charged with crime.

III.

REB UTIAL OF MARKMAN

It is not true that the law enforcement community has learned to live with
Miranda. In fact, the major law enforcement organizations and police organizations have supported Attorney General Meese's position on this issue. As
somebody said shortly after the Miranda decision, if the Court in Miranda had
said that before questioning a suspect an officer must whistle Yankee Doodle,
the police would have whistled Yankee Doodle and would have learned to live
with it. The relevant point is not that the police have learned to comply with
Miranda. The relevant point is that it has caused a great deal of damage to
society. Our solicitude here is not for the police, although they strongly support
the Attorney General's position; it is for society and the cost to society has been
quite substantial.
19. 372 U.S. 33S (1963).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance
of Counsel for his defense.
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The fact that giving Miranda warnings is simple is irrelevant to Miranda's
cost in the custodial process. Miranda has resulted in the transformation of the
fifth amendment from a constitutional provision that prohibits coercion of
suspects into one that effectively prohibits any questioning of many suspects.
This transformation has been carried out without any basis in the text of the
amendment. It is the confessions that are never obtained and would have been
obtained before Miranda that are the cost of this system.
The suggestion that little would change if Miranda were repealed is remarkable. One has only to look to the fact that in Philadelphia ninety percent of
suspects gave statements to the police prior to Miranda, while after Miranda only
about forty percent of such sessions produced the same results. 11 It is untenable
to suggest that this impact is insignficant and that the overruling of Miranda
would have rio impact upon our criminal justice system. The unsolved homicide
rate in this country has more than quadrupled since 1966. Miranda is not the
only factor, but for anyone to suggest that Miranda is irrelevant is simply
unrealistic.
Miranda is not just the forewarnings. A suspect can be told that he has the
right to remain silent, that what is said can be used against him, that there is a
right to an attorney, and that an attorney will be provided if necessary. Yet, if
following such warnings a suspect is asked about a body found in his residence,
and the suspect confesses to the murder, this information will be thrown out of
court. It is not enough to warn; it is not enough to explain rights. It is also
necessary to obtain an affirmative statement by the individual that he is prepared
to speak with the police and that he does not want to consult an attorney. In
too many instances this will never occur. An environment is created which
discourages confessions and discourages individuals from cooperating with police.
When the negative consequences of being candid with the police and the alternatives to doing so are exclusively emphasized to the suspect, it is not surprising
that many decline to give an affirmative waiver and refuse to submit to questioning. It is not a ·matter of just giving four warnings; there is also a matter of
the requirement of an ·intelligent, knowing waiver.
It is said that the language of the fifth amendment does not end the debate.
However, for many of us the language of the amendment does end the debate.
It is the Constitution of the United States which is supposedly the basis of
Miranda. Yet neither the intent of the framers and ratifiers of the fifth amendment
nor the Constitution provide any basis for Miranda. This alone should end the
debate. Even if Miranda was good policy, it is a policy that should be imposed
by legislative authorities, not by courts acting by fiat without any kind of textual
basis in the Constitution. The language of the Constitution does change from
time to time and there is little dispute that it should. Change is allowed
21. See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Low Enforcement: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Lows and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 200-19 (1967).
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constitutionally through article five 22 which provides for constitutional amendments. For anyone else to unilaterally change the Constitution is inconsistent
with the Constitution. Our system works properly only if it respects procedures
for change that are incorporated in article five.
Videotaping of custodial interrogations would provide a superior alternative
to Miranda. Such a procedure would ensure that individuals are not coerced, are
not abused, and are not subject to inappropriate treatment in the questioning
process. Yet at the same time, it would allow police to ask questions in a
nonabusive, non coercive manner. This would be true to traditional understanding
of the fifth amendment from P89 until 1966: the idea that compulsion and
coercion are unlawful but that voluntary statements and confessions are unobjectionable. This traditional concept has nothing to do with the litany and rituals
of the Miranda system.
The solicitude of those who support Mirandll for those individuals who are
guilty of criminal activities and walk because the search for. truth has been
thwarted in the police questioning process is impressive. One wonders if such
solicitude would exist if their close friends or. family members were vi.ctims of
crime. The fact is that every day of the week there are people in this country
whose loved ones, relatives, and friends are subjected to crimimil predation by
individuals who would not be walking the streets but for the impediments to the
pursuit of truth in the criminal justice process that were created by the Miranda
decision.
IV.

REBUTTAL OF MARCUS

The criticism that. somehow Earl Warren magically pulled this new code of
criminal procedure out of thin air in Miranda is wrong. The fact of the matter
is that the Supreme Court has struggled for decades in trying to deal with
confessions and the problems associated with confessions. For most of our legal
history, and still a factor today, is the issue of whether or not a confession was
voluntarily given. That works fine in the brutal cases involving beatings, whippings, and threats. However, the voluntariness test does not work well in cases
which are more subtle, where there are physical or verbal threats, where individuals are cut off, or where the suspect is not very bright. The use of the
22. U.S. CoNST. art. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress:
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year one thousand eight
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in .the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of
its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
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voluntariness test requires the Court to sit as a group of jurors to determine
whether or not the individual knowingly, intelligently, and willingly gave up
constitutional rights.
Seemingly out of utter frustration after Escobedo, 23 the Supreme Court in
Miranda had had enough. In the future police officers would have to give
warnings in order to get confessions admitted. Thus the question becomes, "Why
the great concern?" If police officers simply gave the warnings, with little fuss
and bother, the confessions would be admitted. If the objection to Miranda is
not based solely on the amendment itself or its history, then the focus is on the
warnings; Miranda somehow interferes with the "art" of interrogation.
We have warnings in a lot of areas. It would be unthinkable that a suspect
in a serious felony case would lose the right to counsel simply because he did
not affirmatively ask for a lawyer; that is not a waiver. Under Gideon the
individual has to be told of the right to have an attorney and then the suspect
makes a free and willing decision whether to represent himself or have a lawyer. 24
This decision does not seem to have bothered people very much. Yet under
Miranda there appears to be an argument that by giving the warnings, the system
works too well;· persons now really understand their rights and therefore may
not respond to interrogation. As a matter of policy we must ask ourselves if the
individual really understands his rights prior to confessing. This policy is fair,
equitable, decent, and civilized. Little evidence exists that such a policy has
crippled our criminal justice system. The empirical data of twenty years ago must
be open to question. Moreover, within the last twenty years, times have changed
individuals' understanding of their rights; law enforcement officers are better
trained, better educated, and far more professional. Who is to say what the
impact is of the warnings. Additionally, if the argument is that, by having
Miranda, conviction rates are lower, this argument is just wrong. Conviction
rates remain high across the country and the use of confessions has minimal
impact except in a given number of cases.
There are arguments that, even if Miranda is a good idea, it does not do
its job very well, that there are better ways of making sure that people voluntarily
give up their rights, and are advised of their rights. Such methods include
involving magistrates in the process, having tape recordings, and having time
limits of some sort. In this respect the critics may be right and I would encourage
efforts in these areas. The Supreme Court in Miranda specifically said that the
Miranda decision was no legal straightjacket and encouraged legislators to take
efforts which would both protect individual rights and advise individuals of their
constitutional rights. 2$ Yet the only major effort that has been done in this area
was a blatant and heavy-handed attempt by Congress to legislatively overrule
23. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
24. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Miranda. Such an effort hardly met the calling for innovative and interesting
alternatives by state and federal legislation.
Those who really know what Miranda meant twenty years ago and what it
means today generally do not oppose Miranda. Law enforcement has become
accommodated to Miranda and there appears to be no valid reason to turn back
the clock. Justices who either dissented from Miranda or were known to be
critical of Miranda when it was decided appear to have no yearning to overrule
it today. Former Justice Burger wrote: "The meaning of Miranda has become
reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures: I
would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date. " 26
Justice White who actually dissented in Miranda has said that Miranda confirmed
that a suspect has a right to remain silent and to be free of interrogation until
he has consulted a laywer. Justice O'Connor is on record stating, "[W)ere the
Court writing from a clean slate, I could agree with its holding (narrowing
Miranda). But Miranda is now the law and, in my view, the Court has not
provided sufficient justification for departing from it or from blurring its now
clear strictures," and Miranda "strikes the proper balance between society's
legitimate law enforcement interest and the protection of the defendant's fifth
amendment right. " 27 Warnings as to silence and counsel make good sense in the
criminal justice setting. 28

26. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980).
27. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984).
28. Editor's note: The United States Supreme Court, in a six to two decision announced June
15, 1988 (Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case), extended the
rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) to prohibit custodial interrogation regarding an
unrelated investigation once a suspect has requested counsel, unless the accused initiates the
communication. Arizona v. Roberson, _ _ U.S. _ _ , 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988). Justice Stevens, in
the majority opinion, reiterated the benefits of the prophylactic Miranda warnings: to protect against
the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation and to provide a bright-line rule easily applied by
law enforcement officers and the courts. Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Kennedy, stated his opinion that the per se rule of Roberson was unnecessary. "Balance is essential
when the Court fashions rules which are preventative and do not themselves stern from violations of
a constitutional right." /d. at _ _ , 108 S.Ct. at 2098 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

